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Abstract
We study the problem of asset and liability management of participating insurance policies with guarantees. We develop
a scenario optimization model for integrative asset and liability management, analyze the tradeoﬀs in structuring such pol-
icies, and study alternative choices in funding them. The nonlinearly constrained optimization model can be linearized
through closed form solutions of the dynamic equations. Thus large-scale problems are solved with standard methods.
We report on an empirical analysis of policies oﬀered by Italian insurers. The optimized model results are in general agree-
ment with current industry practices. However, some ineﬃciencies are identiﬁed and potential improvements are
highlighted.
 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Insurance products become increasingly more innovative in order to face competitive pressures. Insurance
policies today come with guarantees on the minimum rate of return, bonus provisions, and surrender options.
These features make them attractive for investors who seek not only insurance but also investment vehicles.
However, the new policies are much more complex to price than traditional insurance products, and we have
witnessed an interest in applying ﬁnancial pricing techniques to the valuation of insurance liabilities. The focus
is shifting away from the traditional actuarial pricing, from static models to stochastic models, see Vanderhoof
and Altman (1998), Babbel and Merril (1998) and Embrechts (2000). Among the most complex insurance
products today we ﬁnd participating policies with guarantees.
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1.1. Features of policies with guarantees
Financial products with guarantees on the minimum rate of return come in two distinct ﬂavors: maturity
guarantees and multi-period guarantees. In the former case the guarantee applies only at maturity of the con-
tract, and returns above the guarantee at some time before maturity oﬀset shortfalls at other times. In the lat-
ter case the time to maturity is divided into subperiods – quarterly or biannually – and the guarantee applies at
the end of each period. Hence, excess returns in one sub-period cannot be used to ﬁnance shortfalls in other
sub-periods. Such guaranteed products appear in insurance policies, guaranteed investment contracts, and
some pension plans, see, e.g., Hansen and Miltersen (2002).
With the historically low interest rates of the last decade the management of such policies is becoming more
challenging. Reliance on ﬁxed-income assets is unlikely to yield the guaranteed rate of return. For instance,
Italian guaranteed rates after 1998 are at 3%. The diﬀerence between the guaranteed rate and the 10-year yield
is only 1%, which is inadequate for covering the ﬁrm’s costs. In Germany the guaranteed rates after 1998 are at
3.5% diﬀering from the 10-year yield only by 0.5%. Danish products oﬀered guarantees of 3% until 1999,
which were reduced to 2% afterwards. In Japan Nissan Mutual Life failed on a $2.56 billion liability arising
from a 4.7% guaranteed investment, highlighting the diﬃculties faced by this industry.
In response to market pressures and regulatory conditions insurers oﬀer currently very conservative guar-
anteed returns. Policyholders are compensated, however, by participating in the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, receiving a
bonus whenever the return of the ﬁrm’s portfolio exceeds the guarantee, creating a surplus for the ﬁrm.
Bonuses may be distributed only at maturity, at multiple periods until maturity, or using a combination of
distribution plans. The earlier unit-linked policies would pay a beneﬁt – upon death or maturity – which
was the greater of the guaranteed amount and the value of the reference portfolio. These simple were maturity
guarantees with bonus paid at maturity as well. At the other extreme of complexity we have the modern UK
insurance policies. These policies declare at each subperiod a fraction of the surplus as reversionary bonus
which is then guaranteed. The remaining surplus is managed as an investment reserve, and is returned to cus-
tomers as terminal bonus if it is positive at maturity or upon death. These policies are multi-period guarantees
with bonuses paid in part at intermediate times and in part at maturity. Further discussion on the character-
istics of products with guarantees is found in Kat (2001) and the papers cited below.
In this paper we consider multi-period guarantees with bonuses that are paid at each subperiod and are
subsequently guaranteed. The bonus is contractually determined as a fraction of the portfolio excess return
above the guaranteed rate during each subperiod. The guaranteed rate is also contractually speciﬁed. To
understand the nature of this product, we illustrate in Fig. 1 the growth of a liability that participates by
85% in a given portfolio while it guarantees a return of at least 3% in each period. The liability is lifted every
time a bonus is paid and the minimum guarantee applies to the increased liability: what is given cannot be
taken away.
1.2. Current models
The pricing of the option embedded in the early products with guarantees was addressed in the seminal
papers of Brennan and Schwartz (1976) and Boyle and Schwartz (1977). They analyzed unit-linked maturity
guarantee policies. Perhaps, the most complete analysis of modern life insurance contracts – complete in the
sense that it prices in a uniﬁed framework several components of the policy – is due to Grosen and Jørgensen
(2000). They decompose the liability of modern participating policies with guarantees into a risk-free bond
(the minimum guarantee), a bonus option, and a surrender option. The ﬁrst two taken together are a Euro-
pean contract and all three together are an American contract, and the authors develop numerical techniques
for pricing both. Hansen and Miltersen (2002) extend this model to the pricing of contracts with a smoothing
surplus distribution mechanism of the form used by most Danish life-insurance companies and pension plans.
They use the model to study diﬀerent methods for funding these products, either by charging the customers
directly or by keeping a share of the surplus. Similarly, Bacinello (2001) develops pricing models that permit
her to study the interplay between the volatility of the underlying asset portfolio, the participation level for
determining bonuses, and the guaranteed rate. Boyle and Hardy (1997) take this line of inquiry in a diﬀerent
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direction by analyzing alternative reserving methods for satisfying the guarantee. More practical aspects of the
problem are studied by Giraldi et al. (2003).
It is worth noting that current literature assumes the asset side is given a priori as a well-diversiﬁed port-
folio which evolves according to a given stochastic process. For instance, Brennan–Schwartz, Grosen–Jørgen-
sen and Bacinello assume a geometric Browning motion, while Miltersen and Persson (1999) rely on the
Heath–Jarrow–Morton framework and price multi-period guaranteed contracts linked either to a stock
investment or the short-term interest rate. There is nothing wrong with these approaches, of course, except
that part of the problem of the insurance companies is precisely to determine the structure of the asset port-
folio. Indeed, all of the above references carry out simulations for diﬀerent values of the volatility of the
assets. Brennan and Schwartz (1979) devote a section to the analysis of ‘‘misspeciﬁcation of the stochastic
process’’. Bacinello goes on to suggest that the insurance company should structure several reference portfo-
lios according to their volatility and oﬀer its customers choices among diﬀerent triplets of guaranteed rate,
bonus provision, and asset portfolio volatility. To this suggestion of endogenizing the asset decision we
subscribe. It is a prime example of integrated ﬁnancial product management advocated by Holmer and Zenios
(1995).
Independently from the literature that prices the option embedded in the liabilities, we have seen an interest
in the use of portfolio optimization models for asset and liability management for insurance companies. The
most prominent example is for a Japanese insurance ﬁrm – not too surprising given what has transpired in the
Japanese ﬁnancial markets – the Yasuda Kasai model developed by the Frank Russel Company. This model
received coverage not only in the academic literature but also in the press, see Carino˜ and Ziemba (1998).
Other successful examples include the Towers Perrin model of Mulvey and Thorlacius (1998), the CALM
model of Consigli and Dempster (1998) and the Gjensidige Liv model of Høyland (1998). These models have
been successful in practical settings but their application does not cover participating policies with guarantees.
One reason is that insurance ﬁrms pursued integrated asset and liability management strategies for those prod-
ucts they understood well. This has been the case for policies that encompass mostly actuarial risk such as the
ﬁre and property insurance of the Yasuda Kasai model. Another reason is that the technology of scenario
optimization through large-scale stochastic programming has only recently been developed into computable
models, see, e.g., Censor and Zenios (1997). Finally, the combination of a guarantee with a bonus provision
introduces nonlinearities which complicate the model.
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Fig. 1. Typical returns of the asset portfolio and a participating policy with multi-period guaranteed return of 3% and participation rate
85%. The guarantee applies to a liability that is lifted every time a bonus is paid as illustrated at period seven. The asset portfolio
experienced substantial losses at period seven while the liability grew at the 3% guaranteed rate. Subsequent superior returns of the assets
allowed the ﬁrm to recover its losses by the 10th period and achieve a positive net return at maturity.
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1.3. Contributions of this paper
This paper extends current asset and liability management literature to address problems that have been
studied thus far only from a pricing perspective. We develop a scenario optimization asset and liability
management model for multi-period participating policies with guarantees. Our model optimizes the
choice of an asset portfolio to deliver the contractual obligations of the policy while maximizing shareholder
value.
The speciﬁc contributions of this paper, and the ﬁndings from the empirical analysis, are as follows:
1. A model that endogenizes the asset structure which has been considered exogenous in the pricing literature
on guaranteed products. Exogeneity of the asset returns is justiﬁed for unit-linked policies, but is not quite
acceptable for modern participating policies whereby the issuer has control of the asset portfolio.
2. An analysis of the tradeoﬀs between shareholders and policyholders in oﬀering guaranteed products. In this
respect, our paper addresses precisely the suggestion made by Bacinello by structuring optimal asset port-
folios. Thus it allows the insurance company to present policyholders with choices that are eﬃcient.
3. The identiﬁcation of optimal asset portfolio volatility for each target guaranteed return. Too low volatility
is associated with low expected returns and portfolios that are unlikely to meet the guarantee. High vola-
tility portfolios are associated with higher expected returns, and are more likely to meet the guarantee.
However, the embedded option is in this case expensive and may erode shareholder value. Siglienti
(2000) argued that portfolios with more than 10–15% in equities are likely to destroy shareholder value.
We ﬁnd that, indeed, too high equity content destroys shareholder value, but for properly optimized port-
folios the cutoﬀ point is around 20–25% in equities.
4. Flexibility in ﬁnancing the guarantee either through reserving or by issuing long- or short-term debt. The
model explicitly recognizes that the reserves will depend on the asset structure – a fact also recognized in
Boyle-Hardy – and optimizes this asset structure viz-a-viz the liability.
5. A benchmark of the policies oﬀered by Italian insurers against optimized policies. We see that policies
backed by optimized portfolios dominate in risk-return space policies backed by the typical portfolios of
Italian insurers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the dynamics of assets and liabilities and develops the
optimization model. Section 3 shows how the model analyzes risk and return tradeoﬀs for diﬀerent policies,
and addresses questions pertaining to the cost of the guarantee and ways for funding this cost. It also analyzes
tradeoﬀs between policyholders and shareholders, and examines the ability of the ﬁrm to satisfy regulatory
requirements. Section 4 benchmarks the Italian policies and looks at international diversiﬁcation and invest-
ments in credit products. The solution of the dynamic equations is given in Appendix A. Appendix B presents
extensive results with the use of the model and can be obtained from the authors.
2. The scenario optimization nonlinear programming model
We develop now the model for asset and liability management for multi-period participating policies with
guarantees. It is a mathematical program that models stochastic variables using discrete scenarios. All port-
folio decisions are made at t = 0 in anticipation of an uncertain future. At the end of the planning horizon the
impact of these portfolio decisions in diﬀerent scenarios is evaluated and risk aversion is introduced through a
utility function. Portfolio decisions optimize the expected utility over the speciﬁed horizon.
2.1. Features of the model
In the model we consider three accounts: (i) a liability account that grows according to the contractual
guaranteed rate and bonus provision, (ii) an asset account that grows according to the portfolio returns,
net any payments due to death or policy surrenders, and (iii) a shortfall account that monitors lags of the port-
folio return against the guarantee. In the base model shortfall is funded by equity but later we introduce alter-
native reserving methods.
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The multi-period dynamics of these accounts are conditioned on discrete scenarios of realized asset returns
and the composition of the asset portfolio. Within this framework a regulatory constraint on leverage is
imposed. At maturity the diﬀerence between the asset and the liability accounts is the surplus realized by
the ﬁrm after it has fulﬁlled its contractual obligations. In the policies considered here this surplus remains
with the shareholders. Of course this surplus is a random variable, and a utility function is introduced to incor-
porate risk aversion.
2.2. Notation
We let X denote the index set of scenarios l ¼ 1; 2; . . . ;N , U the universe of available asset instruments, and
t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; discrete points in time from today (t ¼ 0) until maturity T. The data of the problem are as
follows:
rlit rate of return of asset i during the period t  1 to t in scenario l
rlft risk-free rate during the period t  1 to t in scenario l
g minimum guaranteed rate of return
a participation rate indicating the percentage of portfolio return paid to policyholders
q regulatory equity to debt ratio
Klt probability of abandon of the policy due to lapse or death at period t in scenario l
The variables of the model are deﬁned as follows:
xi percentage of initial capital invested in the i-th asset
ylAt expenses due to lapse or death at time t in scenario l
zlt shortfall below the guaranteed rate at time t in scenario l
Alt asset value at time t in scenario l
Elt total equity at time t in scenario l
Llt liability value at time t in scenario l
RlPt portfolio rate of return during the period t  1 to t in scenario l
yþlt excess return over g at time t in scenario l
ylt shortfall return under g at time t in scenario l
2.3. Variable dynamics and constrains
We invest the premium collected (L0) and the equity required by the regulators (E0 ¼ qL0) in the asset port-
folio. Our initial endowment A0 ¼ L0ð1þ qÞ is allocated to assets in proportion xi such that
P
i2Uxi ¼ 1, and
the dynamics of the portfolio return are given by
RlPt ¼
X
i2U
xirlit; for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; and for all l 2 X: ð1Þ
The investment variables are nonnegative so that short sales are not allowed.
We now turn to the modelling of the liability account. Liabilities will grow at a rate which is at least equal
to the guarantee. Excess returns over g are returned to the policyholders according to the participation rate a.
The dynamics of the liability account are given by
Llt ¼ ð1 KltÞLlt1ð1þ g þmax½aRlPt  g; 0Þ; ð2Þ
for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T , and for all l 2 X.
Whenever the portfolio return is below the guaranteed rate we need to infuse cash into the asset portfolio in
order to meet the ﬁnal liabilities. The shortfall account is modelled by the dynamics
zlt ¼ Llt1 max½g  aRlPt; 0; for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; for all l 2 X: ð3Þ
At each period the insurance company makes payments due to policyholders abandoning their policies be-
cause of death or lapse. Payments are equal to the value of the liability times the probability of abandonment,
i.e.,
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ylAt ¼ KltLlt1ð1þ g þmax½aRlPt  g; 0Þ; ð4Þ
for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T , and for all l 2 X.
In the base model shortfalls are funded through equity. We assume that equity is reinvested at the risk-free
rate and is returned to the shareholders at the end of the planning horizon. (This is not all the shareholders get;
they also receive dividends.) The dynamics of the equity are given by
Elt ¼ Elt1ð1þ rlftÞ þ zlt ; for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; and for all l 2 X: ð5Þ
By assuming the risk-free rate as the alternative rate at which the shareholders could invest their money, we
analyze the excess return oﬀered to shareholders by the participating contract modelled here, over the bench-
mark risk-free investment. In principle one could use the ﬁrm’s internal rate of return as the alternative rate,
and analyze the excess return oﬀered by the policy modelled here over the ﬁrm’s other lines of business. In this
setting, however, the problem would not be to optimize the asset allocation to maximize shareholder value,
since this would already be endogenous in the internal rate of return calculations. Instead we could determine
the most attractive features for the policyholders – g and a – that will make the ﬁrm indiﬀerent in oﬀering the
new policy or maintaining its current line of business. This approach deserves further investigation. For the
purpose of optimizing alternative policies for the shareholders, while satisfying the contractual obligations
to the policyholders, the estimation of excess return over the risk-free rate is a reasonable benchmark. In Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.4 we consider other alternatives for funding the shortfalls through long-term debt or short-term
borrowing.
We now have the components needed to model the asset dynamics, taking into account the cash infusion
that funds shortfalls, zlt , and the outﬂows due to actuarial events y
l
At, i.e.,
Alt ¼ Alt1ð1þ RlPtÞ þ zlt  ylAt; for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ; and for all l 2 X: ð6Þ
In order to satisfy the regulatory constraint the ratio between the equity value and liabilities must exceed q.
That is,
V lET
LlT
P q; for all l 2 X; ð7Þ
where V lET is the value of equity at the end of the planning horizon T. If the company sells only a single policy
the value of its equity will be equal to the ﬁnal asset value – which includes the equity needed to fund shortfall –
minus the ﬁnal liability due to the policyholders, and we have
V lET ¼ AlT  LlT : ð8Þ
Having described the assets and liability accounts in a way that the key features of the policy – guaranteed rate
and bonus provisions – are accounted for, we turn to the choice of an appropriate objective function. We mod-
el the goal of a for-proﬁt institution to maximize the return on its equity, and, more precisely in this case, to
maximize any excess return on equity after all liabilities are paid for.
In details, at the end of the planning period the value of the assets worth AlT , under each scenario. With this
amount the insurance company must liquidate its liability towards the policyholders (LlT ), and refund the
shareholders of the capital (ElT ) infused to cover shortfalls under the minimum guarantee. Note that E
l
T is eval-
uated at the risk-free rate (see Eq. (5)). The reward of the shareholders, under each scenario, is thus given by,
W lT ¼ AlT  LlT  ElT : ð9Þ
The ROEl must be calculated not only on the upfront investment (E0 ¼ qL0), but on the whole equity infused,
so we have that,
ROEl ¼ W
l
T
ElT
¼ A
l
T  LlT  ElT
ElT
: ð10Þ
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In terms of excess ROE (exROEl), we can write
exROEl ¼ A
l
T  LlT
ElT
 1: ð11Þ
The objective of the shareholders is to maximize the excess ROE, or in economic terms, the excess returns
for each unit of equity infused during the whole life of the insurance.1 Since return on equity is scenario depen-
dent we maximize the expected value of the utility of excess return. This expected value is converted into a
certainty equivalent for easy reference. The objective function of the model is to compute the maximal cer-
tainty equivalent excess return on equity (CEexROE) given by
CEexROE¼: U1 Maximize
x
1
N
X
l2X
U
AlT  LlT
ElT
 ( )
; ð12Þ
where Ufg denotes the decision maker’s utility function and AlT  LlT is the shareholder’s reward in scenario l.
We assume a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion of the form UðV Þ ¼ 1cV c, where V P 0,
and c < 1. In the base model we assume c ¼ 0 in which case the utility function is the logarithm corresponding
to growth-optimal policies for the ﬁrm. In Section 3.5 we study the eﬀect of changing the risk aversion
parameter.
As a byproduct of our model we calculate the cost of funding the guaranteed product. Every time the port-
folio return drops below the guaranteed rate, we counterbalance the erosion of our assets by infusing cash.
This cost can be charged either to the policyholders, as soon as they enter the insurance contract, or covered
through shareholder’s equity or by issuing debt. These choices entail a tradeoﬀ between the return to share-
holders and return to policyholders. We study in the next section this tradeoﬀ.
The cost of the guarantee is the expected present value of reserves required to fund shortfalls due to port-
folio performances below the guarantee. The dynamic variable Elt models precisely the total funds required up
to time t, valued at the risk-free rate. However, Elt also embeds the initial amount of equity required by the
regulators. This is not a cost and it must be deducted from Elt . Thus, the cost of the guarantee is given as
the expected present value of the ﬁnal equity ElT adjusted by the regulatory equity, that is,
OG ¼ 1N
XN
l¼1
ElTQT
t¼1ð1þ rlftÞ
 qL0
 !
: ð13Þ
OG is the expected present value of the reserves required to fund this product. This can be interpreted as the
cost to be paid by shareholders in order to beneﬁt from the upside potential of the surplus. A more precise
interpretation of OG is as the expected downside risk of the policy. This is not the risk-neutral price of the par-
ticipating policies with guarantees that would be obtained under an assumption of complete markets for trad-
ing the liabilities arising from such contracts. This is the question addressed through an options pricing
approach in the literature cited above, Brennan–Schwartz, Boyle–Schwartz, Bacinello, Grosen–Jørgensen,
Hansen–Miltersen, Miltersen–Persson.
2.4. Linearly constrained optimization model
The model deﬁned in the previous section is a nonlinearly constrained optimization model. The max and
min operators further increase its complexity turning the problem to a discontinuous nonlinear programming
model (DNLP), which is computationally intractable for large-scale applications.
The only reliable way to solve a DNLP model is to reformulate it as an equivalent smooth NLP model.
Moreover, due to the high dimensionality of the problem, it is advisable to move the nonlinear constraints
to the objective function, leaving only linear equations in the constraints.
1 It can be argued that the shareholders could not sustain very high levels of equity. Note that, since the equity is at the denominator, the
optimization process will select solutions (investment portfolios) such that high levels of the equity are strongly penalized. In those cases
where the optimal solution implies values of the ﬁnal equity too high to be endorsed by the shareholders, it is possible to add appropriate
constraints to limit this variable. This issue is also analysed in Section 3.3 where we study, through post-optimality analysis, how the equity
level can aﬀect the performance of the asset decisions.
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To this purpose, we can rewrite Eqs. (2) and (3) as follows:
Llt ¼ ð1 KltÞLlt1ð1þ g þ yþlt Þ; ð14Þ
zlt ¼ Llt1ylt ; ð15Þ
where,
yþlt ¼ max½aRlPt  g; 0; ð16Þ
ylt ¼ max½g  aRlPt; 0: ð17Þ
The reader will recognise that Eqs. (16) and (17), taken together, deﬁne the following absolute value,
jaRlPt  gj: ð18Þ
The absolute value can be reformulated by introducing a positive and negative deviations as extra variables, so
we have that,
aRlPt  g ¼ yþlt  ylt ð19Þ
yþlt ; y
l
t P 0: ð20Þ
The discontinuity has been converted into lower bounds on the new variables, but bounds are handled rou-
tinely by any NLP solver. Note, however, that the deﬁnition of absolute value requires that yþlt y
l
t ¼ 0. Unfor-
tunately, we cannot add such constraints since the marginal change methods used by most NLP solvers is not
able to move from one half space to the other, and the solution gets stuck at the half space ﬁrst reached.
Provided the objective function has some terms that tries to minimize the new variables introduced, either
yþlt or y
l
t will become zero and the absolute value will end with its proper value (see Appendix A.1 for a dis-
cussion about this point).
The nonlinear constraints (2)–(6) are deﬁnitional constraints which determine the value of the respective
variables at the end of the horizon. We solve these dynamic equations analytically (Appendix A) to obtain
end-of-horizon analytic expressions for AlT , L
l
T , and E
l
T . These expressions are substituted in the objective func-
tion to obtain the equivalent linearly constrained nonlinear program below. The regulatory constraint (7),
however, cannot be linearized. For solution purposes the regulatory constraint is relaxed and its validity is
tested ex post. Empirical results later on demonstrate that the regulatory constraint is not binding for the pol-
icies considered here and the generated scenarios of asset returns. However, there is no assurance that this will
always be the case, and we may need to resort to nonlinearly constrained optimization for solving this model.
Putting altogether, the smooth, linearly constrained, NLP model is given by,
Maximize
xP0
1
N
X
l2X
U ð1þ qÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ RlPtÞ þ
XT
t¼1
ðylt  Kltð1þ g þ yþlt ÞÞ
YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RlPsÞ
"( Yt1
s¼1
ð1 KlsÞð1þ g þ yþls Þ

YT
t¼1
ð1 KltÞð1þ g þ yþls Þ
#
= q
YT
t¼1
ð1þ rlftÞ þ
XT
t¼1
ylt /ðt; T Þ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1 KlsÞð1þ g þ yþls Þ
" #)
ð21Þ
s:t: X
i2U
xi ¼ 1; ð22Þ
aRlPt  g ¼ yþlt  ylt for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T ; and for all l 2 X; ð23Þ
RlPt ¼
X
i2U
xirlit for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T ; and for all l 2 X: ð24Þ
The inverse utility function U1 of the optimal objective value of this problem is the CEexROE.
Standard NLP solvers are based on gradient methods that evolve through a feasible point to another. For
this reason, we determine an initial feasible solution by solving the systems of Eqs. (22)–(24) augmented by the
inequalities AlT  LlT > 0, for all l 2 X. Note that by using a log utility function, we implicitly introduce a bar-
rier which penalizes those solutions such that AlT  LlT ’ 0. It might be possible that for a given sample of sce-
narios no feasible solution exists. In this case the user might allow that under some scenarios AlT  LlT < 0. By
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adding a positive quantity, say , such that the most violated equation yields AlT  LlT þ  > 0, we are able to
determine a feasible solution from which to start.
2.5. Model extensions
We point out possible extensions of this model. Periodic premia can readily be incorporated, as well as
bonus policies based on averaging portfolio performance. Guaranteed rates and bonus rates that are functions
of time, gt and at, are easy to incorporate. Similarly, we can incorporate liabilities due to lapse, although a
lapse model must ﬁrst be built and calibrated such as the one given by Asay et al. (1993), Zenios (1993) or
Nielsen and Zenios (1996). Incorporating participation rates that are functions of the asset returns – as is
the case with the UK insurance policies – complicates the model and requires additional work.
The base model developed here funds shortfalls through equity. Extensions to deal with the funding of
shortfalls through long- or short-term debt are given in Sections 3.2 and 3.4, respectively. Furthermore, unlim-
ited access to equity for funding shortfalls is assumed in the base model. We could do away with this assump-
tion by imposing additional constraints, but this would complicate the model rendering it computationally
intractable. The probability of insolvency is analyzed through post-optimality analysis in Section 3.3, and
is used to guide the debt structure in funding shortfalls through a combination of equity and debt.
3. Model testing and validation
We now turn to the empirical testing of the model. First, we show that the model quantiﬁes the tradeoﬀs
between the diﬀerent targets of the insurance ﬁrm: providing the best products for its policyholders, providing
the highest excess return to its shareholders, satisfying the guarantee at the lowest possible cost and with high
probability. Some interesting insights are obtained on the structure of the optimal portfolios as the tradeoﬀs
vary across the spectrum. Second, we analyze diﬀerent debt structures whereby the cost of the guarantee is
funded through equity or through debt with either long or short maturities. Third, we will see from the empir-
ical results that the Italian insurance industry operates at levels which are close to optimal but not quite so.
There is room for improvement either by oﬀering more competitive products or by generating higher excess
returns for the beneﬁt of the shareholders. How are the improvements possible? The answer is found in the
comparison of the optimal portfolios generated by our model with benchmark portfolios. We will see that
the benchmark portfolios generate tradeoﬀs in the space of cost of guarantee vs net excess return on equity
that are ineﬃcient. The optimized portfolios lead to policies with the same cost but higher excess return on
equity.
The asset classes considered in our study are 23 stock indexes of the Milano Stock Exchange, and three
Salomon Brother indexes of the Italian Government bonds (Appendix B). We employ a simple approach
for generating scenarios using only the available data without any mathematical modelling, by bootstrapping
a set of historical records. Each scenario is a sample of returns of the assets obtained by sampling returns that
were observed in the past. Dates from the available historical records are selected randomly, and for each date
in the sample we read the returns of all assets classes realized during the previous month. These samples are
scenarios of monthly returns. To generate scenarios of returns for a long horizon – say 10 years – we sample
120 monthly returns from diﬀerent points in time. The compounded return of the sampled series is one sce-
nario of the 10-year return. The process is repeated to generate the desired number of scenarios for the 10-year
period. With this approach the correlations among asset classes are preserved.
Additional scenarios could also be included, although methods for generating them should be speciﬁed.
Model-based scenario generation methods for asset returns are popular in the insurance industry – e.g., the
model Wilkie (1995) – and could be readily incorporated into the scenario optimization model. Alternatively,
one could use expert opinion or ‘‘scenario proxies’’ as discussed in Dembo et al. (2000).
For the numerical experiments we bootstrap monthly records from the 10-year period January 1990 to Feb-
ruary 2000. The monthly returns are compounded to yearly returns. For each asset class we generate 500 sce-
narios of returns during a 10 year horizon (T ¼ 120 months). We consider an initial liability L0 ¼ 1 for a
contract with participation rate a ¼ 85% and equity to liability ratio q ¼ 4%. The model is tested for guaran-
tees ranging from 1% to 15%.
388 A. Consiglio et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 186 (2008) 380–404
Author's personal copy
The probability that a policyholder abandons the policy is ProbðdeathÞ þ ProbðlapseÞ. In our experiments we
set lapse probabilities to zero and use probabilities of death from the Italian mortality tables. For each model
run we determine the net annualized after-tax CEexROE
ð
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
CEexROE
T
p
 1Þð1 jÞ; ð25Þ
where j is the tax rate set at 51%.
3.1. Analysis with the base model
The tradeoﬀs between the guaranteed rate and the net CEexROE is shown in Fig. 2. Fig. 3 shows the opti-
mal asset allocation among the broad classes of bonds and stocks for diﬀerent target guaranteed returns.
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Fig. 2. Net CEexROE (annualized) for diﬀerent levels of the guarantee.
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Fig. 3. Broad asset allocation for diﬀerent levels of the guarantee.
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At ﬁrst glance the portfolio structures appear puzzling. One expects that as the guarantee increases the
amount of stock holdings should grow. However, we observe that for low guarantees (less than 7%) the hold-
ings in stock increases with lower guarantees. For low g the embedded option is far out of the money even
when our assets are mostly in equity and very volatile. The asset allocation strategy maximizes CEexROE
by taking higher risks in the equities market. A marginal increase of the shortfall cost allows higher CEex-
ROE. This is further clariﬁed in Fig. 4, showing the tradeoﬀ between cost of the guarantee and net annualized
CEexROE. At values of g less than 7% the option embedded in the liability is out-of-the-money and any excess
return is passed on to the shareholders thus improving CEexROE. As the guarantee increases above 7% the
option goes deeper into the money, the cost of the guarantee increases signiﬁcantly and CEexROE erodes.
Note from Fig. 3 that higher values of the guarantee must be backed by aggressive portfolios with high equity
content, but in this case the portfolio volatility is not translated into high CEexROE but into higher guaran-
teed returns for the policyholders. This is consistent with the conclusion of Siglienti (2000) that excessive
investments in equity destroy shareholder value. However, for the guaranteed rates of 3–4% oﬀered by Italian
insurers it appears that the optimal portfolios consist of 20–25% in equities, as opposed to 15% that was
obtained by Siglienti using simulations.
Finally, we show in Fig. 5 the distribution of the equity to liability ratio (cf. Eq. 7) for a guarantee of 5%.
Similar ﬁgures were obtained for guarantees ranging from 1% to 10%. This ﬁgure shows that for diﬀerent val-
ues of the guarantee the minimum ratio of equity to liability is greater than the regulatory requirement. For
the type of policies analyzed here, and for the scenarios sampled from the past 10 bullish years, the regulatory
constraint is satisﬁed without explicitly including it in the model.
3.2. Financing shortfalls through long term debt
So far we have assumed that the cost of the guarantee is covered by shareholders. It is possible, however,
that such costs are charged to the policyholder or be funded by issuing debt. (Note that for mutual insurance
ﬁrms the policyholders are the shareholders so the point of who pays for the cost is mute. However, the issue
of raising debt remains.) In either case there are advantages and disadvantages. In particular, if we let the pol-
icyholder assume the total cost, we run the risk of not being competitive, loose market share, and experience
increased lapse. If we issue debt, we are liable for interest payments at the end of the planning horizon which
could reduce our ﬁnal return. Furthermore, companies face leverage restrictions. It may not be possible to
cover all the cost of the guarantee by issuing debt because it will increase the leverage of the company beyond
what is allowed by the regulators or accepted by the market.
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Another important point in pursuing this question concerns the maturity of the issued debt. To issue long
term debt we determine the amount of cash that we need to borrow in order to cover, with a certain proba-
bility, future expenditures due to shortfalls over all scenarios. If we indicate by b a conﬁdence level we are
searching for the b-percentile ObG such that the cost of the guarantee O
l
G in scenario l satisﬁes
P ðOlG P ObGjl 2 XÞ ¼ b: ð26Þ
The cost of the guarantee in scenario l is given by Eq. (13) as
OlG ¼
ElTQT
t¼1ð1þ rlftÞ
 qL0: ð27Þ
Note that ObG need not to be raised through the issue of debt only. It is just the reserves needed to fund short-
falls. Strategic considerations will subdivide ObG among policyholder charges, CG, issue of debt or direct bor-
rowing from money markets, DG, and/or equity supplement, ES. Thus, we have
ObG ¼ CG þ DG þ ES : ð28Þ
Given the debt structure implied in (28), we determine the ﬁnal income IlT , for each scenarios l 2 X, as
IlT ¼ AlT  LlT  DGð1þ rbÞT þ ðCG  JSÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ rlftÞ; ð29Þ
where JS are the ﬁxed costs (in percentage of the initial liability) and rb is the borrowing interest rate. Debt
structures for which at least one IlT < 0 should be discarded as leading the ﬁrm into insolvency, even if the
probability of such events is very low.
The net return-on-equity (ROE) corresponding to a given debt structure in each scenario is given by
ROEl ¼ I
l
T ð1 jÞ
qL0 þ ES : ð30Þ
This is not the ex ante excess return on equity optimized with the base mode, but the ex post realized total
return on equity achieved when the structure of debt has also been speciﬁed. This measure can be used to ana-
lyze the probability of insolvency when all the cost of the guarantee is funded by shareholders instead of being
charged, at least in part, to policyholders.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0. 17 0. 19 0. 22 0. 24 0. 26 0. 29 0. 31 0. 34 0. 36 0. 39 0. 41
Equity to Liability Ratio
Fig. 5. Distribution of equity-to-liability ratio at the end of the planning horizon for a guarantee of 5%.
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In Appendix B we report results with the analysis described here. Tables are generated to study the tradeoﬀs
between leverage, policyholder charges, and shareholder returns. Similarly, we can study the eﬀects of diﬀerent
guaranteed returns to the policyholder charges and shareholder returns.
3.3. Insolvency risks
So far we analyzed alternative decisions based only on the net CEexROE and market constrains (policy-
holder charges, leverage, etc.). Our analysis is missing a measure of risk of the ROE. It is not yet clear
how alternative guarantees and debt allocations according to Eq. (28) aﬀect the risk of ROE in Eq. (30).
One could argue that the risk aversion of the decision maker is embedded in the utility function of the opti-
mization model. This is true, but the utility function was used only to guide decisions on the asset side, and
estimating the net total CEROE from (30) does not incorporate risk aversion when choosing a debt structure.
Furthermore, the utility function ensures the solvency of the fund by covering shortfalls with infusion of
equity. However, under certain conditions no external sources of equity will be available. The analysis we
carry out here compensates for these omissions. It considers the risk of insolvency when structuring the debt
structure, thus incorporating risk aversion in structuring the debt in addition to structuring the asset portfolio.
Deﬁne RI as the expected excess return over the risk-free rate for this line of business and rf as the expected
risk-free rate. The rate at which we must discount the ﬁnal income IlG is given by Rl ¼ rf þ RI . For our
shareholders IlG represents the value of the equity at the end of the planning period and they are willing to
stay in this business if the discounted value of this equity is not less than the initial capital invested. The share-
holders will keep their shares if the excess value per share (EVS) is greater than zero with a high probability.
Recalling that the initial amount of equity is qL0 þ ES (ES could be equal to zero) the EVS in each scenario is
given by
EVSl ¼ I
l
Gð1 jÞ
ð1þ RlÞT
 ðqL0 þ ESÞ: ð31Þ
The risk related to a speciﬁc debt allocation is given by the probability that EVS is less than zero, i.e.,
PEVS ¼ P ðEVSl < 0jl 2 XÞ. This is the probability of insolvency and can be determined by calculating the
EVSl for each l 2 X, order from the lowest to the highest and look for the rank of the ﬁrst EVSl that is negative,
i.e.,
PEVS ¼
rankðEVSl < 0Þ
N
: ð32Þ
The EVS can be used to determine the amount of policyholder charges required to make PEVS equal to a given
conﬁdence level. Recall that I lG, and consequently EVS
l, is a function of CG, ES, and DG. If we ﬁx EG then IG is
a function of CG (DG is determined from Eq. 28). Through a linesearch we can determine C

G such that
P ½EVSðCGÞ < 0 ¼ b: ð33Þ
In our experiments we set RI ¼ 6% and the probability of insolvency b ¼ 1%. Fig. 6 shows the results of the
line search which solves Eq. (33) for diﬀerent values of equity supplement ES. We observe that for guarantees
higher than 6% the CEROE increases. How is it possible that higher guarantees can yield higher returns? The
puzzle is resolved if we note that the increase in returns is accompanied by a signiﬁcant increase of policy-
holder charges. The increases in the policyholder charges fund the guarantee and preserve equity from falling
below its present value.
Signiﬁcant increase in charges would be unacceptable to policyholders and would lead to increased lapses.
Our analysis can be used as a demarcation criterion between ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ levels of the guarantee. For
instance the Italian insurance industry oﬀers products with g in the range 3–4%. Our analysis shows that they
could consider increasing g up to 6% without signiﬁcant increase of charges to policyholders or reduction of
CEROE. (One may justify the diﬀerence from the operating guarantee of 4% to the peak optimized value of
6% as the cost of running the business. If so this cost is high.) For guarantees above 6% we note a substantial
increase to policyholder charges at a marginal improvement in CEROE, and this is clearly unacceptable to
both policyholders and shareholders.
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3.4. Short term ﬁnancing of shortfalls
To this point our analysis has determined the cost of the shortfalls ObG and funded it through a combination
of debt DG, charges to policyholders CG, and equity ES. Now, let us ﬁx CG and ES, and let DG ﬂuctuate accord-
ing to the shortfall OlG realized in each scenario. This is equivalent to funding part of the shortfall through
short term ﬁnancing. Instead of issuing a bond for a notional equal to DG and maturity T, we will borrow
money when a shortfall occurs. The debt for each scenario is given by
DlG ¼ OlG  CG  ES : ð34Þ
We assume that it is possible to borrow money at a spread d over the risk-free rate. The deﬁnition of the ﬁnal
income becomes
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0. 06 0.07 0.08
Minimum Guarantee
PolicyHolder_Charges Debt Yearly_Net_ROE
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
Minimum Guarantee
PolicyHolder_Charges Debt Yearly_Net_ROE
Fig. 6. The levels of policyholder charge, debt and net CEROE such that the probability of insolvency is P ½EVSðCGÞ < 0 ¼ 1%. We show
these levels for equity supplement ES ¼ 0:0 (top) and ES ¼ 0:02 (bottom).
A. Consiglio et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 186 (2008) 380–404 393
Author's personal copy
IlT ¼ AlT  LlT  DlG
YT
t¼1
ð1þ rlft þ dÞ þ ðCG  JSÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ rlftÞ: ð35Þ
We can apply the analysis of the previous section to determine policyholder charges CG, and estimate the dis-
tribution of DlG. We solve Eq. (33) and display in Fig. 7 the C

G for diﬀerent levels of the guarantee, and for
d ¼ 2%. Note that policyholder charges CG are substantially lower than those obtained by solving (33) in the
previous section as reported in Fig. 6. This is expected as short-term ﬁnancing of the cost is a dynamic strat-
egy, as opposed to the ﬁxed strategy of issuing long-term debt. These ﬁndings are consistent with the compar-
ison of the two reserving methods in Boyle–Hardy. Since DlG is scenario dependent, it compensates for those
scenarios with high shortfalls, while it is low (or null) for those scenarios with low shortfalls.
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Fig. 7. The levels of policyholder charges, and net CEROE for diﬀerent guarantee such that P ½EVSðCGÞ < 0 ¼ 1%.
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3.5. Choice of utility function
The decision maker’s risk aversion speciﬁes unique asset portfolio to back each guaranteed policy. Clearly
increased risk aversion will lead to more conservative portfolios with higher contents of ﬁxed income. The
result will be a simultaneous reduction in both the CEexROE to shareholders and the cost of shortfalls
required to fund the policy. Fig. 8 illustrates the tradeoﬀ as the risk aversion parameter c varies from 0 (base
case) to 2 (increased risk aversion) for ﬁve diﬀerent target guarantees.
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Fig. 9. Performance of benchmark portfolios (diamonds) against the optimized portfolio (square) for g = 4%. Asset allocation for the
benchmark portfolios is set to 90/10 (bonds/stocks), 80/20, and 70/30, respectively, from top to bottom.
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Note that for low target guarantees increased appetite for risk results in higher CEexROE for a marginal
increase in cost of the guarantee. For higher target guarantees (e.g., 15%) we note a substantial increase in the
cost of the guarantee as the embedded option goes deep in the money when we increase the risk tolerance and
invest into volatile assets. These results conﬁrm our expectations on model performance, and allow users to
generate eﬃcient tradeoﬀs that are consistent with the contractual obligations and the ﬁrm’s risk tolerance.
4. Benchmarks of Italian insurance policies
In order to asses the eﬀectiveness of our model we compare the optimal portfolios with industry bench-
marks. We take as benchmark a set of portfolios with a ﬁxed broad asset allocation between bonds and stocks,
and random allocation among speciﬁc assets. In order to be consistent with the usual ﬁxed-mix strategies and
follow industry practices we set the broad asset allocation between bonds and stocks to 90/10, 80/20, and 70/
30. The results of this experiment are reported in Fig. 9. Note that the optimized portfolios always dominate
the benchmark portfolios in the cost-of-guarantee vs CEexROE space. This ﬁgure justiﬁes the integrative
approach taken in this paper, whereby the insurance policy is analyzed jointly with the asset allocation deci-
sion instead of being analyzed for an a priori ﬁxed asset portfolio.
The results of this section can be extended to incorporate other assets permitted by regulations, such as
mortgages, corporate bonds and international sovereign debt. Italian insurers are allowed to invest up to
10% of the value of their portfolio in international assets. We run the base model for a guarantee of 4%,
and allowing investments in the Morgan Stanley stock indices for USA, UK and Japan and the J.P. Morgan
Government bond indices for the same countries. The internationally diversiﬁed portfolio achieves CEexROE
of 0.14 at a cost of the guarantee of 0.02. By contrast, the results of Fig. 4 show that domestic investments in
the Italian markets fund the guarantee at the same cost but yield a CEexROE of only 0.11. Similarly, invest-
ments in the US Corporate bond market improves the CEexROE to 0.16, but this comes at an increase of the
cost to 0.033.
The results of this section are in general agreement with the current practices of Italian insurers. However,
the optimized results suggest that improved policies and associated asset strategies are still possible.
5. Conclusions
We have developed an integrative asset and liability management model for endowments with guarantees.
It has been demonstrated that the integrative model generates asset structures for speciﬁc insurance policies
that are eﬃcient as opposed to asset strategies developed in a non-integrated model.
Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from the use of the model on data from the Italian insurance
industry. First, we have quantiﬁed the tradeoﬀs between the diﬀerent targets of the insurance ﬁrm: providing
the best products for its policyholders, providing the highest excess return to its shareholders, satisfying the
guarantee at the lowest possible cost and with high probability. Some interesting insights are obtained on
the structure of the optimal portfolios. In particular, we observe that too little equity in the portfolio and
the insurer cannot meet the guarantee, while too much equity destroys shareholder value.
Second, we have analyzed diﬀerent debt structures whereby the cost of the guarantee is funded through
equity or through debt with either long or short maturities. The eﬀects of these choices on the cost of the guar-
antee and on the probability of insolvency can be quantiﬁed, thus providing guidance to management for the
selection of policies.
Third, we have seen from the empirical analysis that Italian insurers operate at levels which are close to
optimal but not quite so. There is room for improvement either by oﬀering more competitive products or
by generating higher excess returns for the beneﬁt of the shareholders and/or the policyholders.
A signiﬁcant extension for the long time horizons of the products considered would be to a multi-stage
model where decisions are revised at time instances after t = 0 until maturity. Such dynamic stochastic pro-
grams with recourse have been developed for asset and liability management by the references given in Section
1. However, for the highly nonlinear problem we are addressing here such models are diﬃcult to develop. The
linearization of the single-stage model developed in Appendix A does not apply directly to multistage formu-
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lations. Specialized algorithms for stochastic programming must be employed for the solution of multistage
extensions of this model.
Appendix A. Solving the nonlinear dynamic equations
In this section, we show how to solve the nonlinear equations (2)–(6) in order to obtain the objective func-
tion (12). At time t = 0, the liability is the pure premium L0. At t = 1 (to simplify the notation we drop the
scenario superscript) we have
L1 ¼ L0ð1 K1Þð1þ g þ yþ1 Þ: ð36Þ
At t = 2 we use the value of L1 from (36) to obtain
L2 ¼ L1ð1 K2Þð1þ g þ yþ2 Þ ¼ L0ð1 K2Þð1 K1Þð1þ g þ yþ1 Þð1þ g þ yþ2 Þ: ð37Þ
Applying this process recursively for each t we obtain the ﬁnal liability as
LT ¼ L0
YT
t¼1
ð1 KtÞð1þ g þ yþt Þ: ð38Þ
For the equity dynamics we have that E0 ¼ qL0. At t ¼ 1
E1 ¼ qL0ð1þ rf 1Þ þ y1 L0: ð39Þ
At t = 2 and substituting for E1 and L1 from (39) and (36) we obtain
E2 ¼ E1ð1þ rf 2Þ þ y2 L1 ¼ qL0ð1þ rf 1Þð1þ rf 2Þ þ L0y1 ð1þ rf 2Þ þ L0y2 ð1 K1Þð1þ g þ yþ1 Þ: ð40Þ
At t = 3 we have
E3 ¼ E2ð1þ rf 3Þ þ y3 L2
¼ qL0ð1þ rf 1Þð1þ rf 2Þð1þ rf 3Þ þ L0y3 ð1þ rf 2Þð1þ rf 3Þ þ L0y3 ð1þ rf 3Þð1 K1Þð1þ g þ y1 Þ
þ L0y3 ð1 K2Þð1 K1Þð1þ g þ yþ1 Þð1þ g þ yþ2 Þ: ð41Þ
Applying this process recursively for each t we obtain after some simple algebra
ET ¼ L0 q
YT
t¼1
ð1þ rftÞ þ
XT
t¼1
yt /ðt; T Þ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1 KsÞð1þ g þ yþs Þ
 !" #
; ð42Þ
where /ðt; T Þ ¼ QTs¼tþ1ð1þ rf sÞ is the cumulative return of the short rate during from t to T.
With the same arguments it is possible to show that
yAt ¼ L0Ktð1þ g þ yþt Þ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1 KsÞð1þ g þ yþs Þ: ð43Þ
For the asset dynamics we have that A0 ¼ L0ð1þ qÞ. At t = 1,
A1 ¼ A0ð1þ RP1Þ þ y1 L0  yA1 ¼ L0ð1þ qÞð1þ RP1Þ þ y1 L0  yA1: ð44Þ
At t = 2 substituting L1 from (36) we obtain
A2 ¼ A1ð1þ RP2Þ þ y2 L1  yA2
¼ L0ð1þ qÞð1þ RP1Þð1þ RP2Þ þ y1 L0ð1þ RP2Þ  yA1ð1þ RP2Þ þ y2 L1  yA2: ð45Þ
The value of the assets at maturity is given by
AT ¼ L0ð1þ qÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ RPtÞL0
XT
t¼1
yt
YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RPsÞ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1þ g þ yþs Þ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1 KsÞ 
XT
t¼1
yAt
YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RPsÞ:
ð46Þ
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By substituting yAt with the expression in (43) we obtain
AT ¼ L0ð1þ qÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ RPtÞ þ L0
XT
t¼1
yt
YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RPsÞ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1þ g þ yþs Þð1 KsÞ
 L0
XT
t¼1
Ktð1þ g þ yþt Þ
YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RPsÞ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1þ g þ yþs Þð1 KsÞ: ð47Þ
Collecting terms we obtain
AT ¼ L0ð1þ qÞ
YT
t¼1
ð1þ RPtÞ þ L0
XT
t¼1
yt  Ktð1þ g þ yþt Þ
  YT
s¼tþ1
ð1þ RPsÞ
Yt1
s¼1
ð1þ g þ yþs Þð1 KsÞ: ð48Þ
A.1. A heuristic evaluation of the optimal solution
We show in this section that the optimal solution of problem (21)–(24) implies that yþlt y
l
t ¼ 0, for
t ¼ 1; 2; . . . T , and for all l 2 X.
Let us suppose that there exists an s 2 X and a time step k such that the solution is optimal with respect to
problem (21)–(24), and that yþsk ; y
s
k are both positive. Let d ¼ minfyþsk ; ysk g, and subtract d > 0 from both
yþsk ; y
s
k . That leaves constraints (23) unchanged, but it modiﬁes the three components of the objective function,
AsT ; L
s
T ;E
s
T , accordingly,
2
Table 1
Asset classes used in testing the model
Code Description
SBGVNIT.1-3 Salomon Brother Italian Government Bond 1–3 years
SBGVNIT.3-7 Salomon Brother Italian Government Bond 3–7 years
SBGVNIT.7-10 Salomon Brother Italian Government Bond 7–10 years
ITMSBNK Milan Mib Historic Banks
ITMSAUT Milan Mib Historic Cars
ITMSCEM Milan Mib Historic Chemicals
ITMSCST Milan Mib Historic Construction
ITMSDST Milan Mib Historic Distribution
ITMSELT Milan Mib Historic Electronics
ITMSFIN Milan Mib Historic Finance
ITMSFPA Milan Mib Historic Finance Holdings
ITMSFMS Milan Mib Historic Finance Misc
ITMSFNS Milan Mib Historic Finance Services
ITMSFOD Milan Mib Historic Food
ITMSIND Milan Mib Historic Industrials
ITMSINM Milan Mib Historic Industrials Misc
ITMSINS Milan Mib Historic Insurance
ITMSPUB Milan Mib Historic Media
ITMSMAM Milan Mib Historic Minerals/Metals
ITMSPAP Milan Mib Historic Paper
ITMSMAC Milan Mib Historic Plants & Machine
ITMSPSU Milan Mib Historic Pub. Util. Serv
ITMSRES Milan Mib Historic Real Estate
ITMSSER Milan Mib Historic Services
ITMSTEX Milan Mib Historic Textile/Clothing
ITMST&T Milan Mib Historic Transportation & Tourism
2 Since the objective function is separable over l 2 X, the change induced by d aﬀects only the terms relative to the scenario s.
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DðAsT Þ ¼ AsT  dð1KskÞ Wðk;T Þ
Yk1
s¼1
ðKssÞð1þ gþ yþss Þþ
XT
t¼kþ1
ðyst Kst ð1þ gþ yþst ÞÞWðt;T Þ
Yt1
s¼1
s 6¼k
ð1þ gþ yþss Þ
2
664
3
775
¼ AsT  dð1KskÞGA;
where Wðk; T Þ ¼QTs¼tþ1ð1þ RPsÞ, and GA is term among square brackets.
DðLsT Þ ¼ LsT  d
YT
s¼1
s 6¼k
ð1þ g þ yþss Þ ¼ LsT  dGL;
and, ﬁnally,
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Fig. 10. Asset allocation for diﬀerent levels of guarantee.
Table 2
Net CEexROE and cost of the guarantee (OG) for diﬀerent levels of guarantee (g)
g CEexROE OG
0.01 0.1347 0.0235
0.02 0.1288 0.0266
0.03 0.1215 0.0256
0.04 0.1134 0.0240
0.05 0.1043 0.0208
0.06 0.0944 0.0255
0.07 0.0838 0.0370
0.08 0.0717 0.0819
0.09 0.0605 0.1372
0.1 0.0488 0.1780
0.11 0.0378 0.2407
0.12 0.0284 0.4117
0.13 0.0212 0.5755
0.14 0.0152 0.7635
0.15 0.0098 0.9809
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DðEsT Þ ¼ EsT  d /ðk; T Þ
Yk1
s¼1
ðKssÞð1þ g þ yþss Þ þ
XT
t¼kþ1
yst /ðt; T Þ
Yt1
s¼1
s 6¼k
ð1þ g þ yþss Þ
2
664
3
775 ¼ EsT  dGE:
By substituting in the objective function and by rearranging the terms, we obtain that,
DðCEexROEÞ ¼ A
s
T  LsT þ d½GL  ð1 KskÞGA
EsT  dGE
:
Provided that ½GL  ð1 KskÞGA > 0 and GE > 0, the objective function can be further maximized by increas-
ing the numerator of d½GL  ð1 KskÞGA, and by decreasing the denominator by dGE. That contradicts the
assumption that the solution is optimal. Therefore, it must be that yþsk y
s
k ¼ 0.
Unfortunately, while GE is always greater than zero by construction, the same cannot be stated, in general,
about ½GL  ð1 KskÞGA.
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Fig. 11. Equity-to-liability ratio at the end of the planning horizon for minimum guarantee 1% and 10%.
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In the post-optimality phase, we analysed the optimal solutions to check that yþlt y
l
t ¼ 0, for t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; T ,
and for all l 2 X. For the set of parameters deﬁning the policies modelled here, we found that the above con-
straints are always satisﬁed.
In case yþlt y
l
t was diﬀerent from zero, for some l and t, and the violation was sizeable, specialized algorithm
for DNLP must be implemented to be sure that, under all possible combinations of data and parameters, the
optimization model (21)–(24) delivers a feasible solution.
Appendix B. Asset classes and further empirical results
The asset classes used in testing the model are given in Table 1. They consist of bond indices for short, med-
ium and long-term debt of the Italian government, and stock indices of the major industrial sectors traded in
the Milano stock exchange.
The broad asset allocation shown in Fig. 3 is broken down among the diﬀerent indices as shown in Fig. 10.
Table 2 displays net CEexROE and OG for the range of guarantees reported in Fig. 4. The diﬀerence of cost
between guarantee levels g ¼ 0:01 and g ¼ 0:05 is just 0.2%. Further results on the distribution of equity to
liability, for diﬀerent levels of guarantee, are shown in Fig. 11. These results are in agreement with Fig. 5 pre-
sented in the main paper.
B.1. Leverage, policyholder charges and shareholder returns
In Table 3 we summarize data that assist the decision maker to take a position according to her strategic
views and constrains. If no entries are displayed these choices cannot be implemented, either because some IlT
Table 3
Net CEROE for diﬀerent combinations of leverage and policyholder charges
Leverage
levels
Policyholder charges
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
0 0.121125 0.124595 0.128295 0.132256 0.136515 0.141118 0.146123 0.151602 0.15765 0.164391
0.125 0.123946 0.127684 0.131656 0.135891 0.14043 0.145317 0.150612 0.156387 0.16274 0.169795
0.25 0.126654 0.13064 0.13486 0.139346 0.144137 0.14928 0.154834 0.160873 0.167495 0.174827
0.375 0.12926 0.133474 0.137923 0.142638 0.147659 0.153033 0.158821 0.165097 0.17196 0.179538
0.5 0.13177 0.136197 0.140857 0.145783 0.151014 0.156599 0.162599 0.169089 0.176169 0.183968
0.625 0.134193 0.138817 0.143673 0.148794 0.154219 0.159997 0.16619 0.172875 0.180151 0.188151
0.75 0.136533 0.141343 0.146381 0.151682 0.157285 0.163242 0.169612 0.176475 0.183932 0.192114
0.875 0.138798 0.143781 0.148989 0.154458 0.160227 0.166348 0.172882 0.179909 0.18753 0.195879
1 0.140991 0.146137 0.151505 0.15713 0.163053 0.169327 0.176013 0.183191 0.190964 0.199468
1.125 0.143118 0.148417 0.153935 0.159706 0.165774 0.172189 0.179016 0.186335 0.19425 0.202896
1.25 0.145182 0.150626 0.156285 0.162194 0.168396 0.174944 0.181903 0.189353 0.197399 0.206177
1.375 0.147188 0.152769 0.15856 0.164599 0.170928 0.177601 0.184682 0.192255 0.200423
1.5 0.149138 0.154849 0.160766 0.166927 0.173375 0.180165 0.187362 0.19505 0.203333
1.625 0.151037 0.156871 0.162907 0.169183 0.175744 0.182644 0.18995 0.197745
1.75 0.152886 0.158837 0.164986 0.171371 0.178039 0.185044 0.192452 0.200349
1.875 0.154688 0.160751 0.167007 0.173497 0.180265 0.187369 0.194875
2 0.156446 0.162616 0.168974 0.175562 0.182427 0.189624 0.197222
2.125 0.164433 0.17089 0.177572 0.184528 0.191814
2.25 0.166207 0.172757 0.179529 0.186571 0.193942
2.375 0.167938 0.174577 0.181435 0.188561
2.5 0.16963 0.176354 0.183294 0.190499
2.625 0.178089 0.185108
2.75 0.179785 0.186879
2.875 0.181443
3 0.183064
3.125
3.25
3.375
The table is built for a guarantee g = 4% at a conﬁdence level b = 1%.
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are negative (this occurs when charges to policyholders are very low and high debt levels yield a negative ﬁnal
income), or because the amount of money necessary to cover shortfalls is absorbed by the policyholder
charges, implying negative debt levels.
For example, by choosing a leverage level equal to 0.5, the highest yearly net CEROE is 0.183. Note that, if
the ﬁrm wishes to achieve higher performance level, then the leverage should also increase. Also, observe the
Table 5
Relationship between PEVS – the probability that excess value per share will fall below zero – leverage and policyholder charges
Leverage
levels
Policyholder charges
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09
0 0.58 0.522 0.462 0.4 0.344 0.278 0.208 0.148 0.096 0.042
0.125 0.534 0.478 0.416 0.366 0.302 0.242 0.172 0.112 0.072 0.02
0.25 0.508 0.444 0.394 0.338 0.274 0.212 0.15 0.1 0.06 0.012
0.375 0.476 0.416 0.368 0.306 0.252 0.188 0.134 0.092 0.042 0.012
0.5 0.444 0.396 0.346 0.284 0.226 0.162 0.118 0.076 0.032 0.006
0.625 0.418 0.374 0.322 0.266 0.212 0.152 0.106 0.068 0.022 0.004
0.75 0.404 0.366 0.304 0.258 0.198 0.144 0.098 0.056 0.016 0.002
0.875 0.4 0.354 0.286 0.234 0.184 0.136 0.092 0.05 0.012 0.002
1 0.378 0.33 0.28 0.224 0.162 0.124 0.088 0.04 0.012 0.002
1.125 0.37 0.318 0.266 0.216 0.156 0.114 0.078 0.036 0.008 0.002
1.25 0.364 0.31 0.264 0.208 0.146 0.108 0.074 0.032 0.008 0.002
1.375 0.356 0.296 0.254 0.2 0.146 0.104 0.07 0.026 0.004 0.002
1.5 0.35 0.286 0.24 0.196 0.142 0.098 0.062 0.026 0.004
1.625 0.332 0.282 0.234 0.188 0.136 0.096 0.06 0.02
1.75 0.322 0.276 0.224 0.178 0.132 0.094 0.054 0.016
1.875 0.316 0.266 0.22 0.162 0.126 0.092 0.052
2 0.314 0.266 0.214 0.156 0.122 0.086 0.05
2.215 0.264 0.214 0.15 0.118 0.084
2.25 0.264 0.208 0.418 0.116 0.08
2.375 0.26 0.202 0.146 0.112
2.5 0.244 0.202 0.146 0.11
2.625 0.198 0.146
2.75 0.196 0.144
2.875 0.196
3 0.19
3.125
3.25
3.375
The table is built for a guarantee g = 4% and conﬁdence level b = 1%.
Table 4
The relation between net CEROE, policyholder charges and guarantee
Policyholder
charges
Minimum guarantee
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
0 0.144564 0.139163 0.135832 0.13177 0.130433 0.120909 0.110348 0.099402
0.01 0.148057 0.142648 0.139726 0.136197 0.136011 0.126397 0.115193 0.102442
0.02 0.151703 0.146281 0.143803 0.140857 0.141965 0.132226 0.120278 0.105562
0.03 0.155517 0.150077 0.148086 0.145783 0.148361 0.138457 0.125641 0.10877
0.04 0.15952 0.154056 0.152599 0.151014 0.155289 0.145166 0.131326 0.112075
0.05 0.163732 0.158239 0.157375 0.156599 0.162863 0.152453 0.13739 0.115487
0.06 0.168182 0.162651 0.162452 0.162599 0.171238 0.16045 0.143903 0.119017
0.07 0.1729 0.167323 0.167876 0.169089 0.180626 0.169337 0.150957 0.122676
0.08 0.177925 0.172291 0.173703 0.176169 0.191338 0.17937 0.15867 0.126479
0.09 0.183304 0.177599 0.180007 0.183968 0.190924 0.167202 0.130443
0.1 0.189093 0.183304 0.18688 0.192664 0.176778 0.134586
The table is built with conﬁdence level b = 1% and liability (debt-to-equity ratio) equal to 0.5.
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inverse relation between leverage and policyholder charges. The greater the amount we charge to the policy-
holder, the lower is the leverage level and the higher the annualized net CEROE.
Our model can generate similar tables to study the many interactions of endowment with guarantee. For
example, we could be interested in investigating the eﬀect of diﬀerent guarantee levels to the policyholder
charges and yearly returns. We ﬁrst estimate, at a given conﬁdence level b, the cost of the guarantee ObG,
and then apportion this cost to policyholders (CG in Eq. 28) and fund the rest through debt or equity sur-
charge. Depending on CG we observe a change in the CEROE to shareholders.
Table 4 shows this relationship. We observe the same behavior we had seen between OG and net CEexROE.
The model chooses more aggressive strategies for low g because it is then possible to achieve higher levels of
CEexROE at little cost. Recall that we are working with percentiles and the impact of aggressive strategies is
much more evident on the tails. When the guarantee is low at g = 0.01 we need higher policyholder charges to
reach the highest return, while for g = 0.05 lower charges are required.
The results in Table 3 should be examined taking into account the measure of risk PEVS associated with the
CEROE of every combination of policyholder charges and leverage level. The probabilities corresponding to
Table 3 are shown in Table 5. Observe that the upper-left entry has a PEVS equal to 0.58. This means that in
58% of the cases the present value of the ﬁnal equity is less than the amount invested today by the shareholder,
even though, net CEROE is acceptable (12%). This position is risky. The reason why this position is quite
risky is due to the fact that we are asking our shareholders to fund the total b-percentile cost of the guarantee.
No charges are passed on to policyholders.
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